Selecting the "Correct" Opposition: The Decree that Ate the Legislature
The Index Post - Staff
May 18, 2026
SPLM-IO Members of National Parliament on May 11, 2026 demonstrating against the tabling of the Constitution Amendment Bill, proposing to strip the peace agreement
In the short, turbulent history of the Republic of South Sudan, we have often been forced to choose between the hope of a new beginning and the cold reality of institutional fragility. As a South Sudanese observer who has watched our nation emerge from the crucible of a long and heroic struggle for justice and dignity, I find myself looking at the events of May 2026 with a sense of profound déjà vu. The story of our survival is currently being written not on the battlefield, but in the halls of Juba, through the dry and often contradictory language of presidential decrees and constitutional articles.
On May 4, 2026, President Salva Kiir Mayardit issued Decree RSS/RD/J/147/2026, which revoked the appointments of 47 Members of Parliament representing the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA). This move, which targeted loyalists of First Vice President Riek Machar, represents the latest attempt to solve a political problem—the rejection of unilateral amendments to our peace deal—with a legal hammer.
To understand the gravity of these dismissals, one must first understand the "scaffolding" that holds our transitional government together: the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The R-ARCSS is not just a peace treaty; it is the Supreme Law of our transition, designed to take precedence over any national legislation, including the Transitional Constitution, in the event of a conflict.
At the heart of the R-ARCSS is a meticulously negotiated responsibility-sharing ratio. To ensure that the voices of the opposition were not drowned out, the TNLA was expanded to 550 members. The math was intentional: the Incumbent TGoNU was allotted 332 members, while the SPLM-IO was granted 128 members. When the President revokes 47 members in a single decree, he is effectively removing the last remaining MPs from the SPLM-IO, after after removing many in the past months, after detaining the First Vice President Riak Machar.
The political context is even more revealing. These dismissals were reported to have occurred in retaliation for a May 11, 2026, walkout from parliament. The SPLM-IO members refused to participate in the tabling of an amendment bill that they argued was introduced in a non-inclusive manner. By responding to a peaceful legislative protest with mass removal, the executive has signaled that the TNLA is no longer a forum for deliberation, but a chamber for compliance.
The President’s decree cites Article 106A(2)(a) of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended). This article broadly outlines the functions of the President as the head of State and Government. However, we must confront the constitutional paradox at the core of our governance.
Our Constitution is explicit about how a Member of the National Legislature loses their seat. Under Article 63, a seat is vacated only due to death, resignation, change of political affiliation, mental infirmity, or conviction for an offense involving honesty. Crucially, the Constitution does not grant the President the power to "revoke" a parliamentary appointment at will.
By interpreting the general power to "appoint" constitutional post-holders as a power to "dismiss" them without cause, the Presidency has effectively placed the entire legislative branch under executive control. This is a direct erosion of the separation of powers—a principle mandated by Article 51 of our Constitution and reinforced by the R-ARCSS. If legislators serve at the pleasure of the person they are tasked to oversee, the very concept of accountability becomes a fiction.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this decree is the replacement strategy. Alongside the removals, Kiir issued a separate decree appointing 47 new lawmakers from a rival faction of the SPLM-IO led by Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Kuol.
This reflects a dangerous trend: the executive branch is increasingly picking its own "opposition." By recognizing a rival faction as the "peace partner" and removing those perceived as loyal to the detained First Vice President Riek Machar, the government is hollowing out the pluralism that the R-ARCSS was intended to protect.
This move directly violates the Replacement and Removal Procedures outlined in Article 1.13 of the R-ARCSS. The agreement specifies that each party may remove its representatives and nominate replacements by notifying the President with fourteen days' notice. By initiating the removal from the top-down, the President has inverted the hierarchy of the peace process. The political parties—the signatories who bled for this agreement—have been stripped of their right to self-representation.
The "Makuei Doctrine" and the Institutional Soft Coup
We cannot view these dismissals in isolation from the broader attempt to dismantle oversight. Justice Minister Michael Makuei Lueth recently issued a legal opinion characterizing the 2018 peace accord as “originally defective”. Makuei argued that because time is running out for the 2026 National Elections, the government should simply “bypass” the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC).
This "Makuei Doctrine" is a form of institutional suicide. The RJMEC is the primary body tasked with reporting "serious incidents of violation" to the IGAD Council of Ministers. By attempting to "deprive it of its intentions," the Ministry of Justice is advocating for a soft coup against the very framework that gives the transitional government its legitimacy.
The R-ARCSS is founded on the premise of "collegial collaboration". Decisions within the Presidency must be reached through mutual understanding between the President and the Vice Presidents. The unilateral removal of 47 MPs—without the consent of the First Vice President—is the antithesis of this collaboration. It is a return to the "Big Man" politics that has repeatedly plunged our nation into civil war.
The Geopolitical Stakes and the Rule of Law
The international community—our Guarantors from IGAD, the African Union, and the Troika—has a direct stake in this crisis. They have warned that any amendments to the peace agreement require consultation and approval from all signatory parties, including the Machar-aligned SPLM-IO.
When we allow the executive to decimate the opposition's legislative wing, we are not just debating personnel; we are debating the Permanent Ceasefire. Peace in South Sudan is a fragile ecosystem. It relies on the belief that grievances can be resolved through the Transitional National Legislative Assembly rather than through the muzzle of a gun. If the TNLA is "turned into a weapon" against the peace agreement, the incentive for factions to remain within the peaceful framework diminishes rapidly.
The Path Forward: Pluralism or Autocracy?
The road to National Elections in 2026 is already fraught with delays. Our nation lacks a permanent constitution and a completed population census. The government’s justification for these unilateral moves is "the need for speed" to reach the ballot box. But an election held in an environment of political intimidation is not an election; it is a coronation.
For an election to be "free, fair and credible," it must reflect the “will of the electorate”. That will is currently temporary represented by the 128 members of the SPLM-IO and other opposition groups in the assembly. If those representatives can be purged by decree for the "crime" of walking out in protest, then the transition to a permanent constitution—a process meant to be "led and owned by the people of South Sudan"—is effectively dead.
In conclusion, the revocation of these 47 appointments is a warning sign that our transition is at a terminal crossroads. We are drifting away from the "peaceful transition mechanisms of the peace agreement" and promised in our Preamble and toward a re-centralization of power that our Constitution was designed to prevent. Unless our leaders return to the spirit of collegial collaboration and respect the institutional safeguards of the R-ARCSS, Soutyh Sudan risks becoming the most predictable tragedy.
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