South Sudan Embarks on Recruiting More Judges, More than a Hundred Interviewed So Far
The Index Post
May 1, 2026
Gender Based Violence and Juvenile Court in Juba
Juba, South Sudan - On May 4, 2026, the library of the Gender-Based Violence Court in Juba became the focal point for the future of South Sudanese governance. As candidates for the High Court bench underwent vetting for their fluency in English and mastery of substantive law, the surrounding political infrastructure showed signs of systemic failure. The judiciary’s drive to recruit over 100 new judges for second-grade, first-grade, and High Court positions is a massive technical undertaking, yet it occurs in the shadow of a stalled transition. The 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) remains the nominal guide for the nation, but its mandates for judicial restructuring have been largely ignored by the executive. While the Judiciary of South Sudan (JoSS) proceeds with these appointments, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) warns that the absence of a reformed Judicial Service Commission (JSC) renders the entire process legally suspect. The rule of law is being expanded by the same hands that are currently unravelling the peace agreement’s supremacy.
The ongoing recruitment cycle is unprecedented in its scale and speed. According to internal protocols, the process began with Second Grade Judges between April 6 and April 9, followed immediately by First Grade Judges from April 13 to April 18. May 4 marked the commencement of the final and most sensitive phase: the four-day interview window for High Court Judges.
The vetting criteria are strictly technical. Candidates are assessed on their knowledge of substantive laws and procedures, eloquence, and age—35 for the High Court and 25 for lower courts. Under the Judiciary Act 2008, these appointments are made by the President on the recommendation of the President of the Supreme Court.
However, the 2008 Act is a relic of the pre-independence era. The R-ARCSS explicitly mandated a total "restructuring of the Judiciary" and a "review of the Judiciary Act" to ensure independence. That reform was supposed to be spearheaded by an Ad Hoc Judicial Reform Committee (JRC). While the JRC completed its work and submitted its final report in December 2024, the RJMEC’s latest quarterly report for 2026 confirms there has been "no progress in implementing the report". By proceeding with recruitment under the old law, the government is effectively bypassing the very reforms designed to prevent executive overreach.
The institutional danger lies in the composition of the body that oversees these judges. The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is the constitutional gatekeeper of judicial integrity. The peace agreement required the JSC to be reconstituted to implement "appropriate judicial reforms". As of June 2026, this reconstitution has not occurred.
Consequently, the current recruitment of over 100 judges is being conducted by an unreformed commission that RJMEC describes as lacking the necessary "independence and accountability". This is not merely an administrative oversight; it is a structural defect. Without a multi-party, independent JSC to vet the candidates, the bench is vulnerable to political patronage. This risk is heightened by the fact that the Supreme Court President—who recommends these new judges—is himself an appointee of the President and is technically "answerable to the President" for the administration of the Judiciary.
The judicial hiring spree is unfolding against a backdrop of worsening political fragmentation. The RJMEC reports that the "governance provisions" of the peace agreement have seen only "minimal progress" in early 2026. Trust between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar has evaporated, replaced by a series of unilateral executive actions.
On January 20, 2026, President Kiir dismissed the Minister for Interior, a key SPLM/A-IO appointee, and replaced her with a loyalist from the RTGoNU-SPLM. This was followed on January 7 by the dismissal of 11 members of the Transitional National Legislature (TNL) affiliated with Machar. These legislators were replaced by individuals aligned with a splinter faction. Machar’s allies have characterized these moves as a "unilateral purge" that violates the responsibility-sharing ratios mandated by the R-ARCSS.
If the legislature can be purged by decree, the judiciary remains the only potential check on executive power. However, by staffing the High Court and County Courts with over 100 new judges under the old system, the executive is essentially ensuring that the judicial "check" is composed of its own picks.
The 2026 Election Pressure Cooker - The urgency of these appointments is driven by the December 2026 election deadline. The Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) has recently proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS that seek to "delink" the election from the permanent constitution-making process and the national census.
RJMEC has expressed "serious concerns" over these proposals, noting that they go beyond simple technical adjustments and actually "annul the sanctity and supremacy" of the peace agreement. In an environment where the census and the constitution are being bypassed, the judiciary will be the final arbiter of electoral disputes. Staffing the courts now is a strategic imperative for any party seeking to control the outcome of those disputes.
Under Section 15 of the Judiciary Act 2008, the High Court holds appellate jurisdiction over lower courts and primary jurisdiction over nearly all civil and criminal matters. These are the judges who will sit in every state capital to decide which votes are counted and which candidates are disqualified.
Even if the recruitment process were impartial, the environment these judges are entering is one of advanced institutional decay. The RJMEC reports that judicial reforms are "exacerbated by limited time, capacity gaps, and funding constraints".
The government’s financial management has been equally erratic. The 2025/2026 National Budget was presented seven months late and failed to comply with the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act. Inflation is currently at 15%, and while the government claims to be pursuing an "anti-inflationary fiscal policy," the delay in salary payments for existing civil servants is a chronic issue.
For the 100+ new judges, this economic instability creates a high risk of corruption. A judge who is not paid a predictable salary under the "independent financial budget" promised by Section 6 of the 2008 Act is a judge who is susceptible to external "allowances" provided for by presidential circulars.
The international community, led by IGAD and the African Union, has called for "inclusive dialogue" to address the current political deadlock. On January 30, 2026, President Kiir established a "leadership body" to guide election dialogue, but notably excluded representatives from Machar’s SPLM/A-IO. RJMEC warns that this exclusion "is feared to further fuel tensions and polarize the country".
The judicial recruitment is the technical arm of this polarization. By filling the bench under the 2008 Act while the JRC reform report is suppressed, the government is creating a judiciary that is legal in form but political in function. The Judiciary Act 2008 remains the only governing authority, yet it lacks the "sanctity and supremacy" of the reformed system envisioned in the peace agreement.
As the interviews in the Juba library conclude this week, South Sudan is moving closer to a bench that is fully staffed but widely perceived as illegitimate. If the December 2026 elections are contested—as the current "unilateral actions" and "deep mistrust" among parties suggest they will be—the lack of an independent, reformed judiciary could be the trigger for a return to "large-scale violence".
The recruitment of 100 plus judges should have been a milestone for the rule of law. Instead, in the current political climate, it looks like the final preparations for a one-party state.
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